前回のエントリで紹介したように文書のテキスト解析に特化したGoogle Cloud Vison APIの”DOCUMENT_TEXT_DETECTION”に日本語がまだ対応していないため、英語の文書で試してみました。今回は2つの英語の文書について、以下をそれぞれ試しました。
- Google Cloud Vison API “TEXT_DETECTION”（画像データからOCR）
- Google Cloud Vison API “DOCUMENT_TEXT_DETECTION”（文書の画像に特化したOCR）
- ＧｏｏｇｌeドライブからのGoogleドキュメント（参考: 新しいGoogleドライブで画像やPDFをOCRにかける方法 | 経験知）
今回、”DOCUMENT_TEXT_DETECTION”で使用したスクリプト（kekiさんがQitaで公開したocr.php）の一部を以下のように修正したものを使用しました。
"features" => array(
array(
"type" => "DOCUMENT_TEXT_DETECTION",
"maxResults" => 10,
),
),
"imageContext" => array(
"languageHints" => array("en"),
),
結論から申せば、Googleドライブを使ったほうだ断然よい、というか、”DOCUMENT_TEXT_DETECTION”のほうの結果が、”TEXT_DETECTION”とほとんど変わらないというか、単純に”TEXT_DETECTION”を”DOCUMENT_TEXT_DETECTION”を置き換えて、英語に言語指定するだけではだめなのか、APIの投げ方に問題がなかったか検証が必要そうです。
“The American ventures in East Asia”
“The American ventures in East Asia”の29コマ目です。
Vison API “TEXT_DETECTION”
48
pact. Similar to Hay’s Notes of 1899 and 1900, no
“commitment” or “promise” was made as to any sort
of guarantee on the part of the signatory nations
CHAPTER V
What was to happen then should one of the signa
The Kellogg Pact
tories fail to live up to her pledge? The signatories
only agreed to “full and frank communication. Let
it be repeated again-“full and frank communica-
tion.” Taking for granted that a nation did break
the pledge, how, by any stretch of the imagination, can
this be interpreted as implying any guarantees or
obligations on the part of the United States? Even
if there had been obligations, the burden did not lay
onlv with the United States, but rather to nine-or
shall I say nineteen nations.
In the preceding chapter, I have endeavoured to
plain the fallacy of the Nine-Power Treaty which
was utilized by the Washington Administration to
force Ameriea to pick European chestnuts out of the
foreign fire. The Kellogg Peace Pact has often been
cited as another reason why America found m-
bent on herself to invite armed conflict against Nippon.
The Pact in question was signed in Paris on August
27, 1928, with much fanfare, to become popularly
known as the Pact of Paris or the Kellogg-Briand
Pact. However, it soon became universally known as
the Kellogg Paet, because, as usual, America was
giving the world the impression that she was the sole
ex
l of these nations signed and ratified the same
Ninc-Power Pact, adopting these same principles
Hence, it is difficult to understand what reason there
was, if any, for the United States alone to be so anxi
ous of invoking the Nine-Power Treaty against the
Nipponese? There was but one answer. It was simply
because the Roosevelt Administration desired to whip
up public sentiment against Nippon; so as to prepare
the American people, to support an aggressive Roose-
velt policy towards Nippon to push her against the
wa
surety.
Before going further, let us first investigate the
contents of this Pact. The Pact was signed to “con-
demn recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies” and to “agree that the settlement or
1. Frank B. Kellogg, Secretary of State under President Coolidge.i
Vison API “DOCUMENT_TEXT_DETECTION”
48
pact. Similar to Hay’s Notes of 1899 and 1900, no
“commitment” or “promise” was made as to any sort
of guarantee on the part of the signatory nations.
What was to happen then should one of the signa
tories fail to live up to her pledge? The signatories!
only agreed to full and frank communication.” Let
it be repeated again full and frank communica
tion.” Taking for granted that a nation did break
the pledge, how, by any stretch of the imagination, can
is be interpreted as implying any guarantees or
obligations on the part of the United States ? Even
if there had been obligations, the burden did not lay
only with the United States, but rather to nine—or
shall I say nineteen nations.
CHAPTER V
The Kellogg Pact
All of these nations signed and ratified the same
NinePower Pact, adopting these same principles,
Hence, it is difficult to understand what reason there
was, if any, for the United States alone to be so anxi
ous of invoking the Nine-Power Treaty against the
Nipponese P There was but one answer. It was simply
because the Roosevelt Administration desired to whip
up public sentiment against Nippon; so as to prepare
the American people, to support an aggressive Roose
velt policy towards Nippon to push her against the
wall.
In the preceding chapter, I have endeavoured to
explain the fallacy of the Nine-Power Treaty which
was utilized by the Washington Administration to
force America to pick European chestnuts out of the
foreign fire. The Kellogg Peace Pact has often been
cited as another reason why America found it incum
bent on herself to invite armed conflict against Nippon.
The Pact in question was signed in Paris on August
27, 1928, with much fanfare, to become popularly
known as the Pact of Paris or the Kellogg-Briand
Pact. However, it soon became universally known as
the Kellogg’ Paet, because, as usual, America was
giving the world the impression that she was the sole
surety.
Before going further, let us first investigate the
contents of this Pact. The Pact was signed to con
demn recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies” and to “agree that the settlement or
1. Frank B. Kellogg, Secretary of State under President Coolidge
GoogleドライブからのGoogleドキュメント
– 48 –
pact. Similar to Hay’s Notes of 1899 and 1900, no ‘commitment’ or ‘promise’ was made as to any sort of guarantee on the part of the signatory nations.
What was to happen then should one of the signatories fail to live up to her pledge? The signatories only agreed to “full and frank communication.’ Let it be repeated again-‘full and frank communication.’ Taking for granted that a nation did break the pledge, how, by any stretch of the imagination, can this be interpreted as implying any guarantees or obligations on the part of the United States? Even if there had been obligations, the burden did not lay only with the United States, but rather to nine-or shall I say nineteen nations.
All of these nations signed and ratified the same Nine-Power Pact, adopting these same principles. Hence, it is difficult to understand what reason there was, if any, for the United States alone to be so anxious of invoking the Nine-Power Treaty against the Nipponese? There was but one answer. It was simply because the Roosevelt Administration desired to whip up public sentiment against Nippon; so as to prepare the Americam people, to support an aggressive Roosevelt policy towards Nippon to push her against the wall.
CHAPTER V The Kellogg Pact
In the preceding chapter, I have endeavoured to explain the fallacy of the Nine-Power Treaty which was utilized by the Washington Administration to force America to pick European chestnuts out of the foreign fire. The Kellogg Peace Pact has often been cited as another reason why America found it incumbent on herself to invite armed conflict against Nippon. The Pact in question was signed in Paris on August 27, 1928, with much fanfare, to become popularly known as the Pact of Paris or the Kellogg-Briand Pact. However, it soon became universally known as the Kellogg’ Pact, because, as usual, America was giving the world the impression that she was the sole surety.
Before going further, let us first investigate the contents of this Pact. The Pact was signed to “condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies’ and to “agree that the settlement or
1. Frank B. Kellogg, Secretary of State under President Coolidge,
Starvation,” phase analysis of strategic mining blockade of Japanese Empire. Report No. 2-g(9), USSBS Index; Section
“Starvation,” phase analysis of strategic mining blockade of Japanese Empire. Report No. 2-g(9), USSBS Index; Section 7の5コマ目です。
今回は出力するJPEGは100%で試しました。
Vison API “TEXT_DETECTION”
Phase Analysis of the Twentieth Air Force Strategic Mining Blockade of the Japanese Empire
SECTION A-OVERALL PLANNING
movement of a
issiOn
able vessels would strike a severe blow to the Ja-
9,000,000
45.. _1,190,000
,810,000
The mining was to be of a st
wes to supplement the st
The estimates which follow show the importance of
and food into Japan.
upply and deployment of he
ports required by Japanese indu
es were sea
2,000
48,000
marine transporta
Lon within the Inland Sea.
ron (iron ore and in
It was believed that the mining, if carried out
ze of 4000
These large ships were the
n force, would terninate practically all imports
into Japan; first of raw materials, finally of food
AS a result, enemy ind
terials and eventually cea3θ produ
emy population would be reduced to starvation.
effect of starvation would combine with the incendi
ary raids to reduce the civilian wi
Therefore, the operation wa s calle! STaRV.IT
oking coal
would bθ Starved for ma
on, and the en
rc
y damage one 10,000 ton ship at
be obtained if the same mine sank
o wage war.
As regards food alone
demaged one 1000 ton ship.
in Japan were such that the difference of 20 to 30
percent was the differ
ence and starvation for a large part of the popula
ce between actual subsist
The shipping necessary
enemy wa
000 passa
mately 12,000 locel voy
When the mining campaign began,
Inside the Japanese Home laters, the Inland Sea
and 15,000 voyages to
approximately 2,000,000 gt of shipping of 1000 gt or
over afloat
Shimonoseki Straits into the Sea of Japan end the
Yellow Sea, as well as to the southern areas con
egion
forms a natural freight shipping route, well pro
tected and free from the overland obstacles of ter
rain which have prevented the development of exten
sive railroads and motor transportation facilities.
hs a result, 75 percent of ail transportation was arkedly.
wa terborne, including 57 percent of all the coa
This shipping passed freely through
disperse indu
Force
were alreedv s
es, a move made necessary by the
strategic bombing of Japan by the Twentieth Air
tation requirements
via the Stralts of Formosa.
uered by the Japanese,
Very little Japanese shipping was able to challenge
the mastery of the American subnarines in Pacific
oads and motor facilities
ned to the maximum, this had to be
by sea
Further
tion of his stockpiles by incen
diary and bombing raids required an abnormal trans
One-half of the power used in the great in
epa
but on the other hand, enemy minefields and
egions of Kobe-Osaka, Nagoya, and Tokyo
escorts, as well as air patrols, prev
fective utilization of our forces against the ship
ping in the Japanese Inner Zone
shipping and the routes were adequate at the begin
ning of the year to supply the enemy’s needs in the
Inner Zone
was obtained from waterborne coal
fer of raw mat
als between different regions. Iın
ansfer of his fuel supplies, which
The amount of
of Jepenese ships aveilable had bee
re stored in s few regions, could be greatly dis
organized by strategic mine warfare.
ces in the
outh had been reduced, such a disorganization would
It is estinated that foods and raw materials
further seriously affect his war industry.
were moving into Japan at a rate of from 1,000,000
to 1,500,000 tons per month. There were numerous
indications that, whatever the shipping requirements
were, Japan’s shipping position was approaching a
marginal point, and that any further substantial re
ve minefields, difficul
represents schematically the
lroad routes of Jepan and indicates the ports
ch 45 was as follows for steel ships of 1000 gt
served by railroads which might be used for diver
ry ports
CONFIDENTIAL
Vison API “DOCUMENT_TEXT_DETECTION”
C ON D ENTIAL
Phase Analysis of the Twentieth Air Force Strategic Mining Blockade of the Japanese Empire
SECTION A-OVERALL PLANNIE
tal Gro Tons
The Mission
Th ng mission plet, the destruc.
tion o: th Japanes hipb lines of communic
tion The thr Principal objecti re
tion in either he number or roov il
Bl sel ould trik severe blo to the J
panes er conomy
hippi f1 t, 7 Dec 41 plus all
bse qui tio; d co;
stry ti 41-27 Mar 45
9,000,000
Less sinkin
The mining to be of a trategic natur nd
Is to suppl nt the tegic bombi Jap
Th estimates which follo sho th rt
wet borne freight to the Japanes
7 Dec 41-27 r 45
190,000
pr ent the
ind food into Japan
rtat fr materials
otal af1
27 tra 45
1,810,000
To provent the st pply and deploy nt of he
11t y for
During 1944 th following perc tag If im.
port required by Jap industr
Less 0 perc t factor to co
ships in pai
62,000
80 pers
11 oil supplies
Total ope Bl 27 lar 45
1,448,000
To disrupt her int
ton thin the Inland
arine transporta.
It believed that the mining, if carried out
in 2 uld terminat tically all imports
int Japan; first of r materia finally of food
result ened ind try uld be starved for ne
terials nd a vent lly c production and the a
ay population ould be reduced to tar tion Th
ffect If starvation ld bi oth the incendi
Iry raids to reduce th ivil ian ill to rage
The refor the operation s called STARVATI
The Target
Wh the mining campaig beg the nemy had
approximately 2,000,000 Bt shipping of 1000 Bt or
r afloat This shipping pas freely through
himonoseki Straits into th of Japan and the
Yello tell a to the outhern areas con.
u »d by the Japanese th traits of Formos
Very little Japane shipping wa Bl to challeng
the mastery of the American submarines in Pacific
ter but on the other hand, enemy ninetields and
>rt rell Sir patrols prevented any er
fect tilization of our forces gainst the ship
ping in the Japanese Inner zone The amount of
shipping and the route wer at the begin
ning of the year to supply the onemy’s needs in the
Inner Zon
It is estimated that food ind ra materials
rore moving into Japan at a rate or from 1,000,000
to 1,500,000 tons per month. There ere numerous
indications that whatever the shipping uirements
Japan’s shipping positio. approaching a
Irginal point and that any rurther substantial
88 percent ll iron iron o: d in.
Bots th. 60 of the of this
4 percent ll coal (including 90 per shippin composed of ships ith f 4000
it coking coal gro! larger These large ship. th
price target: of the ining probl st
20 percent 11 food ink ships tively ine could ink or
iously da 10,000 tonship ti th
profit that ld be obtained if th ine Iank
1s regards food alone the nutrition standards or damaged 1000 tonship
in Jap such that the difference of 20 to 30
per t Wes th differ between actual subsist The shipp: necessary to support the faltering
once and starvati for large part of the popul ind try ch year requi pp imately
tion. ,000 passag hinese ind Kore ports ia
himonoseki traits pproximately 12,000 local voy
Inside the Japt aters th Inland S eges betv n In. sea port: and 15,000 voyage to
forms a natural freight shipping route rell pro the Kobe -Osaka region As the itt ipted to
ted Id fre from the overland obstacle of ter disperse ind tri made necessary by th
rain which have p revented the development of strategic b bing Japan by th Twentieth Air
siv railroads ind motor transportation facilities Force his transportation requirements incre sed
result 75 perc of il transportation was markedly ince his railroads and motor facilities
terborne including 57 percent of all the coal ere alr ady strained to the maximum this had to be
sed One-half of the power used in the gr It is ffected largely by tr portati Further.
dustrial regions of Kobe-Osaka Nagoya and Tokyo e, the dest ti of his st kpiles by incen
was obtained from laterborne coal diary and be abing id required an abnormal trans
fer of raw terial pen different regions. In
particular , the transfe or his fuel supplie hich
he number of J: ships teilabl had be re stored i regions could be greatly dis
greatly reduced by our submarine Irfar but the organized by strategic mine rfare Because the
emaining shipping for the time being ul flo of oil aviation gets fre his our in the
Bl to our submarin ttacks beca it outh had been reduced, such a disorganization would
rating in the Inner One nd protected by ex further riously affect his war industry.
tensive minefield difficult to pe trat Plat I ( page 20 represents schematically th
Japanes rchant fleet po ition of 27 railroad routes fJ pan and indicates the ports
ch 45 was as follows for teei ships •f 1000 gt served by ilroad vhich might be used for diver.
and er sionary pe rts
C O N FIDENTIAL
GoodleドライブからのGoogleドキュメント
C O N F | DENTIAL
Phase Analysis of the Twentieth Air Force Strategic Mining Blockade of the Japanese Empire
SECTION A-OVERAL PLANNING
The Mission
The In1n ing mission was to complet e the de struction of the Japanese shipborne lines of communication. The three principal objectives were:
l. To prevent the importation of raw materials and food into Japan.
2. To prevent the supply and deployment of her military forces.
3. To disrupt her internal marine transportatilon wl thin the Inland Se8 .
It was belie ved that the mining, if carried out, in force, would terminate practically all imports into Japan; first of raw materials, finally of food. As a result, enemy industry would be starved for materials and eventually cease production, and the enemy population would be reduced to starvation. The effect of starvation would combine with the incendiary raids to reduce the civilian will to wage war. Therefore, the operation was called ST.RVATION.
The Torget
When the mining campaign began, the enemy had approximately 2,000,000 gt of shipping of looC) gt or Over 8a fall Oat This shipping passed freely through Shimonoseki Straits into the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, as well as to the southern areas conque red by the Japanese, via the Straits of Formosa. Very little Japanese shipping was able to challenge the mastery of the American submarines in Pacific waters, but on the other hand, enemy minefields and escorts, as well as air patrols, prevented any effective utilization of our forces against the shipping in the Japanese Inner Zone. The amount of shipping and the routes were adequate at the beginning of the year to supply the enemy’s needs in the Inner Zone.
It is estinated that foods and raw na terials were moving into Japan at a rate of from l,000,000 to l , 500 000 tons per month. There were numerous indications that, whatever the shipping requirements were, Japan’s shipping position was approaching a marginal point, and that any further substantial re
duction in either the number or IOOvement of availsable vessels would Strike a severe blow to the Japanese war economy.
The mining was to be of a strategic nature, and was to supplement the strategic bombing of Japan. The estimates which follow show the importance of waterborne freight to the Japanese.
During l?44 the following percentages of imports required by Japanese industries were sea borne:
l. 80 percent of all oil supplies.
2. 88 percent of all iron (iron ore and in
gots).
3. 24 percent of all coal ( including 90 percent coking coal).
4. 20 percent of all food.
As regards food alone, in Japan were such that the percent was the ence and tion.
the nutrition standards
difference of 20 to 30 difference between actual subsiststarvation for a large part of the popula
Inside the Japanese Home laters, the Inland Sea forms a natural freight shipping route, well prote cted and free from the overland obstacle S of terrain which have prevented the development of extensive railroads and motor transportation facilities. As a result, 75 percent of all transportation was waterborne, including 57 percent of all the coal used. One-half of the power used in the great indus trial regions of Kobe-Osaka, Nagoya, and Tokyo was obtained from waterborne Coal.
The number of Japan ese ships available had been greatly reduced by our submarine warfare, but the remaining shipping, for the time being, was invulnere ble to our Submarine attacks be cause it w2s Operating in the Inner Zone, and was protected by extensive minefields, difficult to penetrate.
The Japanese mer chant fleet position as of 27 ..arch 45 was as follows for steel ships of loC0 gt and Over:
Total Gross Tons
Chipping a float, 7 De C 4l plus all Subsequent a c quisitions and construction, 7 Dec 4l-27 Mar 45 . . . . . 9,000,000
Less sinkings, 7 Dec 4l-27 l’ar 45. . ll 90,000
Total afloat, 27 lar 45. . . . . . . . . . . l,8l.0,000 Less 20 per cent factor to cover Ships in repair. . . . . LSL S SLLL SLSL SS S SS SSSSS S SSSSSSLSSSSSSSSSS 3b2,000
Total oper able, 27 lar 45. . . . . to l, 448,000
fore than 60 percent of the tonnage of this shipping was composed of ships with a size of 4000 gross tons or larger. These large ships were the prime targets, and one of the mining problems was to sink ships selectively. One mine could sink or seriously damage one lo,000 ton ship at ten times the profit that would be obtained if the same mine sank or damaged one l000 ton ship.
The Shipping, necessary to support the faltering enemy war industry each year required approximately l2,000 passages from Chinese and Korean ports via Shimonoseki Straits, approxima tel y l2,000 local voyages between In) and Sea ports, and l3,000 voyages to the Kobe-Osaka region. As the enemy attempted to disperse industries, a move made necessary by the strategic bombing of Japan by the Twentieth Air Force, his transportation requirements increased markedly. Since his railroads and motor facilities were already strained to the maximum, this had to be effected largely by sea transportation. Furthermore, the destruction of his stockpiles by in cendiary and bombing raids required an abnormal transfer of raw materials between different regions. In particular, the transfer of his fuel supplies, which were stored in a few regions, could be greatly disorganized by strategic mine warfare. Because the flow of oil and aviation gas from his sources in the South had been reduced, such a disorganization would further seriously affect his war industry.
Plate I (page 20 ) represents schematically the railroad routes of Japan and indicates the ports served by railroads which might be used for diversinary ports.
CON FIDENTIAL
